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     This paper explores multiple experimental interventions in molecular biology. By 
“multiple,” we mean that molecular biologists often use different modes of experi-
mental interventions in a series of experiments for one and the same subject. In per-
forming such a series of experiment, scientists may use different modes of interven-
tions to realize plural goals such as testing given hypotheses and exploring novel phe-
nomena. In order to illustrate this claim, we develop a framework of multiple modes 
of experimental interventions to analyze a series of experiments for a single subject. 
Our argument begins with a brief characterization of Craver and Darden’s taxonomy 
of experiments, because the taxonomy they have made implies various modes of in-
terventions (Carver and Darden 2013). We propose to extract two interventional direc-
tions and two interventional effects from their taxonomy as the basis of classification. 
The vertical or inter-level direction means that an intervention is performed between 
different levels of organization and the horizontal or inter-stage direction means that 
an intervention is performed between different stages of a mechanism. Interventions 
may produce an excitatory or an inhibitory effect. As a consequence, we can classify 
modes of interventions according to different directions and effects. We illustrate our 
claims by doing a case study of the PaJaMo experiment, which is a series of experi-
ments for a single subject. The final goal in this paper is to provide a taxonomy of 
characteristics of experimentation in which the PaJaMo experiment is adequately lo-
cated.  




        
        The molecularization of biology has raised a range of new questions and issues 
for the philosophy of biology, especially questions about the uses of experiments and 
interventions. For example, how interventional experiments contribute to discovering 
new phenomena and adding new knowledge in molecular biology, what experimental-
ly causal reasoning is used in identifying mechanistic components that are responsible 
for some phenomenon, whether or not there are different kinds of interventions can be 
discerned, and how many kinds of interventions utilized by molecular biologists. 
These questions are important, because molecular biology is basically an experimen-
tal science and uses interventional method in almost all of experiments. More particu-
larly, molecular biologists often use a series of organized experiments for exploring a 
single subject. By performing that series of organized experiments, they realize plural 
aims and attain plural outcomes. How do molecular biologists design and organize a 
series of experiments for a single subject? In order to answer these questions, the best 
way is to examine an actual complicated experiment in the history of molecular biol-
ogy.  
        The PaJaMo experiment performed by Arthur Pardee, Francois Jacob, and 
Jacque Monod, is one of the most famous experiments in the history of biology 
(Craver and Darden 2013:138). Philosophers of biology such as Kenneth Schaffner 
(1974a, 1974b, 1993) and Marcel Weber (2005) examine it from the perspective of 
theory generation; and Carl Craver and Lindley Darden (2013) also analyze the exper-
iment from the perspective of testing and discovering schemas of mechanisms.  Their 1
contributions offer much help in our understanding of this famous experiment. In this 
paper, we would like to add a new understanding from the perspective of experimen-
tal interventions for realizing both testing and exploration aims. 
      Testing is a recognized aim of making experiments. In the end of the 20th century, 
exploratory uses of experimentation have been explored (Burian 1997; Steinle 1997). 
Philosophers tends to make a dichotomous distinction between testing (or theory-dri-
ven in Steinle’s term) experimentation and exploratory experimentation. However, we 
wonder whether or not there is a kind of experiments that are both testative and ex-
ploratory. Waters (2004, 2008) provides a non-theory-centric methodology which 
combining explanatory reasoning and investigative strategies for classical and molec-
ular genetics. Although Waters did not analyze experimental interventions in details, 
his work can serve well as an exemplar for us to develop a similar analysis on the in-
terventions in the PajaMo experiment.  
 Darden and Craver have drawn attention to the discovery of a new and key component in the mecha1 -
nism of protein synthesis in the PaJaMo experiment (Darden and Craver 2002). On their account, the 
discovery of messenger RNA (presumed to be ribosomal templates) required the integration of aspects 
of the mechanism by interfiled. Molecular biologists studied forward from the DNA to the next stage in 
protein synthesis while biochemists worked backward from peptide bonds to activated amino acids 
(Darden and Craver 2002:80-84). However, they don’t analyze the PaJaMo experiment in details nor 
focus on the notion of experimental interventions.           
!2
    Mechanistic philosophers such as James Woodward (2002) , Craver (2007), and 2
Craver and Darden (2013) have widely analyze experimental interventions, connect-
ing them with the analyses of mechanisms. From the view of new mechanical philos-
ophy, knowledge of mechanisms is necessary for understanding, predicting, and con-
trolling biological phenomenon (Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000; Darden and 
Craver 2002; Glennan 2002; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; Darden 2006). Experi-
mental interventions are used by molecular biologist as powerful instruments to help 
produce knowledge of biological mechanisms (Machamer, Darden, and Craver 
2000:17). Carver and Darden (2013) further distinguish various types of experiments 
in which a taxonomy of interventional modes is implied. Inspired by the pioneering 
philosophers’ work, we intend to make the implicit taxonomy of interventional modes 
explicit and to inquire whether or not different modes might be used together in a se-
ries of organized experiments for both test and exploration. 
       A taxonomic framework of modes of experimental interventions is characterized 
by the following three points: (i) We can distinguish different modes of experimental 
interventions according to two standards: the interventional direction and the inter-
ventional effect. (ii)  Two interventional directions (vertical/inter-level and horizontal/
inter-stage) and two interventional effects (excitatory/positive and inhibitory/nega-
tive) can be identified. The vertical or inter-level direction means that an intervention 
is performed between different levels of organization and the horizontal or inter-stage 
direction means that an intervention is performed between different stages of a 
process. (iii) In a series of related experiments, scientists can use multiple interven-
tional modes to test given hypotheses and to explore novel objects. 
      Since our study is inspired by the classification of experiments in Craver and Dar-
den (2013), we will begin by summarizing their new mechanistic philosophy and of-
fer a brief characterization of their classification of types of experiments in section 2. 
Section 3 reinterprets the classification as a framework of interventional modes. Then, 
we argue that the reinterpretation provides a new framework of the modes of experi-
mental interventions. In section 4, we introduce a new kind of experimental interven-
tions, the inter-stage kind, which Craver and Darden do not mention. Section 3 and 4 
jointly argue for the points (i) and (ii). Section 5 takes the PaJaMo experiment on the 
synthesis of β-galactosidase in E. coli to illustrate all the points (i)-(iii). The final sec-
tion provides a taxonomy of characteristics of experimentation in which the PaJaMo 
experiment is adequately located. 
2. Craver and Darden’s classification of types of experiments 
   
      Ever since 2000, Craver and Darden jointly develop a mechanism-based and dis-
 Woodward has proposed a counterfactual account of the concept of mechanism (Woodward 2002). He 2
argues that components of mechanisms should behave in accord with regularities that are invariant un-
der interventions. On his account, Jacob and Monod's lac operon model and the experimental results 
will be correctly described and predicted by the notion of modularity of mechanism. Melinda Fagan 
also has analyzed lac operon model (Fagan 2016). By contrast with Woodward, she argues that the me-
chanical account with interventions will not always provide an entirely satisfactory account for the case 
of double preventions or omissions. She proposes a new, complementary mechanistic explanation for 
that case. However, they focalize on the operon model rather than the PaJaMo experiment in details. 
The PaJaMo experiment is an important base of construction of the theoretical model. 
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covery-oriented methodology for biological sciences, especially molecular biology 
and neuroscience (Machamer, Darden and Craver 2000; Craver and Darden 2001, 
2005; Darden and Craver 2002). They majorly analyze reasoning strategies that are 
used for discovering mechanisms that underling living phenomena. In addition to 
these analyses, they contribute a long chapter in their 2013 book, In Search of Mecha-
nisms, to analyze how experimentation works to help discover mechanisms (Craver 
and Darden 2013, Ch. 8). 
      Craver and Darden argue that discoveries of mechanisms are usually made piece-
meal via repetitive refinements, which can be guided by interventional experiments. 
They also analyze processes in which scientists use experimental interventions to test 
schemas (or models) of mechanisms and then to discover actual mechanisms. In 
search of a full mechanism, scientists may manipulate some part of a mechanism, in-
tervene in its process, and then observe the changes occur in the termination condition 
of the mechanism. The observed changes provide a piece of useful evidence or a 
guide for discerning the entity and activity that are causally relevant to the behavior of 
the mechanism from that are not. Scientists use the information from manipulations 
and interventions to infer what could come before or next in the mechanism by 
“backward chaining” or “forward chaining”  (Darden and Craver 2002). A whole pic3 -
ture of the mechanism is thus puzzled out. In their words, scientists use interventional 
experiments to transform a how-possible constructed schema into a how-actual de-
scription of a mechanism (Machamer, Darden and Craver 2000:17; Craver and Dard-
en 2001; 2005:235; Darden and Craver 2002).  
      In order to provide a full analysis of experimentation, Craver and Darden make a 
taxonomy of experiments in Chapter 8 of In Search of Mechanisms. They distinguish 
loosely three categories of experiments: those for testing causal relevance, those (in-
terlevel experiments) for testing componential relevance, and those (complex experi-
ments) for asking specific mechanistic questions. The second category is classified 
into three subkinds: interference experiments that are bottom-up and inhibitory, stimu-
lation experiments that are bottom-up and excitatory, and activation experiments that 
are top-down and excitatory. The third category is in turn categorized into three sub-
categories: by-what-activity experiments, by-what-entity experiments, and series of 
experiment with multiple interventions. They also discuss the famous PaJaMo exper-
iment under the independent title “preparing the experimental system,” showing that 
the experiment also uses multiple interventions.    
      Craver and Darden emphasize that their goal “is not to offer a systematic taxono-
my of experimental types but rather to call attention to the ways that experiments…, 
to answer specific questions about how a mechanism works.” (Craver and Darden 
2013:119) However, their work still leaves a strong impression that they are making a 
taxonomic system of experiments, not only because they use the term “kind” in the 
context but also because they classify kinds into subkinds. Moreover, they say that 
interlevel experiments have “the three most common kinds” (p.126) and consider 
 According to Darden and Craver, backward and forward chaining are reciprocal strategies for discov3 -
ering mechanisms. When scientists reason about one part of a mechanism on the basis of what is al-
ready known in the schematic mechanisms, they can reason from the beginning by forward chaining or 
from the end by backward chaining. Forward chaining use the experimental results in early stages to 
reason or conjecture about the information that are likely to be found in later stages; backward chaining 
is just the reverse (Darden and Craver 2002).   
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“some alternative kinds of experiments” that fail to fit their intervene-and-detect 
structure (p.129). All indicates that they are classifying kinds of experiments in the 
framework of new mechanical philosophy. 
      Two features in Craver and Darden’s taxonomy of experiments are noteworthy. 
The first feature is that their taxonomy implies a taxonomy of interventional modes, 
which will be examined in next section. This implication allows us to interpret and 
treat their taxonomy of experiments as a taxonomy of interventional modes. The sec-
ond feature is that Carver and Darden pay more attention to experimental tests in the 
process of discovering a mechanism while say less about experimental investigation, 
exploration, and discovery. However, experiments in molecular biology often perform 
many functions other than testing. 
      Exploratory uses of experimentation have been gotten attention since the end of 
the 20th century (Burian 1997; Steinle 1997). Exploratory experiments are “driven by 
the elementary desire to obtain empirical regularities and to find proper concepts” and 
“typically takes place in those periods of scientific development in which – for what 
ever reasons – no well-formed theory or even no conceptual framework is available or 
regarded as reliable.” (Steinle 1997: S70) Moreover, a few philosophers of science 
note that many experiments in classical and molecular biology share the characteris-
tics of exploratory experimentation (Waters 2004; Burian 2007; O’Mallye 2007). 
Other philosophers such as Kenneth Waters (2008) and Chen (2013) argue that, in 
classical and molecular genetics, incidental discoveries of novel phenomena in the 
process of experimenting can be used as investigative tools to discover mechanisms 
and construct hypotheses or models. For examples, Gregor Mendel’s hybridization 
experiment with peas incidentally discovered the segregation and the independent as-
sortment of hereditary units and led to the discovery of Mendelian mechanism of 
heredity. Frederick Griffith’s experiment with Pneumococcus discovered the trans-
formation of bacteria cells and led to a series of discoveries of molecular mechanisms 
of heredity (Chen 2013). Molecular biologists, M. Hammarlund, E. Jorgensen, and M. 
Bastianis, learned the crucial guidelines from the unexpected phenomena in their ex-
periment and lead to the discovery of the function of β-spectrin protein in neurons 
(Waters 2008). In those cases, scientists incidentally discovered the novel phenomena 
by performing an experiment or a series of organized experiments without the direc-
tion of theories, and those discoveries in turn urged them to search for the underlying 
mechanisms. Experiments that discovered those novel phenomena use interventions 
and possess an exploratory or investigative characteristic. The previous discussion 
indicates that reconsidering the exploratory or investigative function of experimental 
interventions will shed light on the analysis of the PaJaMo experiment and other simi-
lar ones in molecular biology. 
3. Modes of Experimental Interventions 
      Craver and Darden (2013) classify the second category of interlevel experiments 
into three subkinds based on their so-called the invervene-and-detect structure. Inter-
ference experiments are bottom-up and inhibitory. Stimulation experiments are bot-
tom-up and excitatory. Activation experiments are top-down and excitatory. In those 
bottom-up experiments, “one intervenes into a component in a mechanism and detects 
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changes in the behavior of the mechanism as a whole.” (Craver and Darden 2013:125-
126) In those top-down experiments, one intervenes on the start conditions to manipu-
late the phenomenon and detects the behavior of the components in the mechanism. 
However, we wonder whether or not there are top-down and inhibitory experiments, 
one intervenes on the start conditions to inactivate or inhibit the phenomenon and de-
tects the behavior of putative components in the mechanism. We think that vaccina-
tion experiments are the very kind. In a vaccination experiment, scientists inactivate 
or reduce the pathogenicity of some kind of pathogenic bacteria by physical and 
chemical methods or kill them, and then inject the attenuated or killed bacteria vac-
cine into subjects, and see if target organs of subjects no longer manifest relevant 
symptoms.  
      Since all “subkinds” of interlevel experiments share the intervene-and-detect 
structure, we should interpret the four experimental types as four interventional 
modes. We view bottom-up and top-down as two different interventional directions 
that are not mutual exclusive, because one may exert different interventional direc-
tions into the same mechanism. Similarly, we view excitation and inhibition as two 
interventional effects that are neither mutual exclusive, because an intervention may 
produce both excitatory effect on one component and inhibitory effects on another 
component in the same mechanism. Thus, we build up a temporary framework of ex-
perimental interventions that has four modes based on the two directions and the two 
effects: a top-down excitatory, a top-down inhibitory, a bottom-up excitatory, and a 
bottom-up inhibitory intervention. This is the distinction of interventional modes 
rather than the taxonomy of experimental types, because different modes may be ap-
plied in one and the same experiment.  
    Consider Julius Axelord’s series of experiments that Craver and Darden use to ex-
emplify their third category of series of experiments with multiple interventions. In 
the series of experiments, Axelrod and his colleagues seek to discover the mechanism 
for regulating neurotransmitters by conducting multiple interventions at different 
stage. Craver and Darden reports:  
First, he injected rats with norepinephrine to increase their blood 
pressure….killing the nerves innervating the eyes and the salivary glands…In 
a second intervention they then injected the cats with labeled nor-
epinephrine….In a third intervention, they then stimulated the live sympathet-
ic nerve and showed that…transmitter is in fact released from the neurons. In 
a fourth intervention…they showed that they could prevent the labeled trans-
mitter from being re-sequestered by treating the nerves with cocaine. (Craver 
and Darden 2013:134-137).  
Two features are worth to be pointed out. First, these interventions are operated in 
both the top-down direction on killing the nerves and the bottom-up direction on in-
jecting norepinephrine and stimulating the live nerves. They are not mutual exclusive. 
Second, these interventions produce both an inhibitory effect and an excitatory effect 
that are neither mutually exclusive. For example, injecting the neurons with cocaine 
brings about an inhibitory effect for the nervous system on blocking the reuptake of 
neurotransmitters, but also produces an excitatory effect for endogenous neurotrans-
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mitters between two neuron synapses on remaining the positive effect. Interventional 
effects might be usually opposite, but not be mutually exclusive necessarily.  It de-
pends on how initial state or base line being changed by intervention. An excitatory 
effect should trigger or excite the behavior of the mechanism while an inhibitory ef-
fect should eliminate or shut-down the phenomenon. Axelrod’s series of experiment 
just shows that the two interventional directions may be combined with the two inter-
ventional effects to form the common framework for the categories of “experiments 
for testing causal relevance”. 
4. “Inter-stage” interventions 
      We now further argue that the framework can be adequately applied to the catego-
ry of “experiments for testing componential relevance.” If our argument is right, then 
Craver and Darden’s distinction between “experiments for testing causal relevance” 
and “interval experiments for test componential relevance” is unnecessary. Consider 
vaccination experiments. If some kind of pathogenic bacteria in a vaccination experi-
ment is confirmed as the etiological cause of the relevant symptoms and disease, then 
the interlevel experiments for testing componential relevance can be also interpreted 
as the experiments for testing causal relevance if we take an integrated view of 
causality and mechanisms which is developed in Darden (2013:24-26)and Chen 
(2017:141-143).  According to this view, a mechanism has at least five causal aspects: 4
(1) a mechanism as a complete cause, (2) a mechanism piece as a partial cause, (3) a 
stage in a mechanistic process as a partial or complete cause in a causal chain, (4) an 
activity in a mechanism as a cause of micro-change in the mechanism, and (5) a dis-
turbance as a cause of an abnormal output of the mechanism (see Fig. 1). These as-
pects include part-whole relations, for example, entities and activities are parts of 
mechanism or lower-level mechanisms are parts of higher-level mechanisms; and 
cause-effect relations, for example, a previous stage is a cause of later stage in a 
mechanism or making a difference by intervention is a cause of what happens in the 
later stage.    
 Darden have articulated the temporal feature of mechanisms. What she argues is that the interfeild 4
relation between Mendelian and molecular biology best characterized as "investigating different, serial-
ly integrated, hereditary mechanisms” (Darden 2005). Mechanisms of the two fields operate at different 
times and are composed of different working entities of different sizes. Our interest in this paper is ex-
ploring another aspect of temporal feature, that how a stage of a given mechanism is identified to an 
etiological factor, and what mode of this intervention will be.
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Figure 1. Integrating five causal aspects into a hierarchical structure. Arrow 
1, 2, and 4 represent part-whole relations; arrow 3 and lighting bolt with arrow 5  
represent cause-effect relations. 
This integrated view of mechanism and causality allow us to introduce a kind of 
“inter-stage” interventions in order to build a more complete framework of experi-
mental interventions. For this purpose, we especially focus on (3), because, since bi-
ology is going more and more molecular, even genomic and post-genomic, molecular 
scientists often need to design and operate interventional experiments to investigate 
continuous stages of the mechanism involved in embryology, epigenetics and devel-
opmental biology. For example, in order to understand how cells having identical 
genomes develop differentiated and transmit particular characters to the offspring, 
scientists need to produce various mutations as interventional tools and then to com-
pare of target DNA sequences and the relative gene regulation and expression in a hi-
erarchy of mechanism levels. Their goal is to discover the various stages occurring in 
a particular order of a mechanism.  
That’s why we need to take the temporal and etiological factor into our account. 
In such cases, the causal relevance exists between different stages rather than between 
different levels. As a consequence, we have “inter-stage” experimental interventions, 
whose direction is horizontal. By contrast, the direction of the bottom-up and top-
down interventions is vertical.  
Interventions in the vertical direction occur between two levels, for examples, 
neuroscientists may put the rat in a maze and record the electrical activity of neurons 
in the rat hippocampus, and molecular biologists may intervene on one nucleotide se-
quence that codes some genetic information in organisms and observe the impact in 
the behavior of a mechanism as a whole. As we have seen in Section 3, vertical or “in-
ter-level” interventions have the “top-down” and the “bottom-up” kinds or modes. 
Interventions in the horizontal direction occur in different stages in a mechanistic 
process, for example, molecular biologists may engineer a part of a mechanism at the 
phase of the initiation of transcription and investigate changes on the later steps of 
elongation or termination. Particularly the regulatory mechanisms have different 
working entities serially operating at different times in an extended process. The inter-
level kind of interventions can be used to test and investigate any putative part of 
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some mechanistic model while the inter-stage kind can be used to test and investigate 
any putative stage of some mechanistic process.   
To determine the feature of an entity or activity involved in the mechanism, sci-
entists attempt to make some difference at the inputs and see whether such an inter-
vention brings about some corresponding change at the outputs. If the entity or activi-
ty plays an excitatory role in the mechanism (such as an excitatory neurotransmitter 
and promoter), then removing it should induce or in some way prevent the phe-
nomenon. If the entity or activity plays an inhibitory or regulating role in the mecha-
nism (such as an inhibitory neurotransmitter or repressor), then removing it should 
excite or at any rate change the phenomenon. If, in contrast, the part plays no role in 
the mechanism, then making a difference of the component should be of no conse-
quence. There are typically two kinds of consequences: excitatory effect and inhibito-
ry effect. We call the consequences that are tending to activate, excite, stimulate the 
original states are “excitatory effects”. Those that are tending to eliminate, shut-down, 
inhibit the original states are “inhibitory effects”. Adding the horizontal modes to the 
previous four modes, a we have six interventional modes: top-down excitatory, top-
down inhibitory, bottom-up excitatory, bottom-up inhibitory, inter-stage excitatory, 
and inter-stage inhibitory.  
In the excitatory kind of inter-level mode, one intervenes on the start level to en-
hance or activate some part (e.g., injecting norepinephrine or stimulating the live 
nerves) and observes the reactions on another level. In the inhibitory kind of inter-lev-
el mode, one intervenes on the start level to weaken or inhibit some part (e.g., making 
a mutation on some sequence of genes) and detects the reactions on another level. In 
the excitatory kind of inter-stage mode, one intervenes to trigger or increase transcrip-
tion of the regulated gene at the upstream stage (e.g., adding an activator to help 
polymerase binding the promoter) and see the changes at the downstream stage. In the 
inhibitory kind of inter-stage mode, one intervenes to inactivate or shut down a part in 
the upstream stage and assess the changes at the downstream stage of a particular 
gene (e.g., knocking out a gene in an organism and investigating the effect of gene 
loss). 
       Here we extend Craver and Darden’s intervene-and-detect structure to a fuller 
framework of experimental interventions. We distinguish six interventional modes 
according to three directions and two kinds of effects. Furthermore, we will argue that 
the six modes can occur in a single experiment or a series of organized experiments 
for one and the same subject next section. This work not only answers the question 
about how many modes of experimental interventions used by molecular biologists, 
but also gives a more comprehensive view to the role of experimentation contributing 
to acquire new biological knowledge.  
      Given a new framework of experimental interventions with six modes, we want to 
analyze how different interventional modes to be used to test hypotheses and to inves-
tigate novel phenomena, entities, or objects.  
      A basic aim of experimentation is to test hypotheses. There are different types of 
hypotheses to be put into tests, for examples, a causal hypothesis, or a mechanistic 
model as a whole, or a putative part (an entity or an activity) of a mechanistic model, 
or a putative stage of a mechanistic model. In order to uncover a complete mechanism 
underlying a phenomenon, scientists may perform a lot experiments or a series of ex-
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periments to test all causal hypotheses related to a mechanistic model and all assump-
tions of putative parts and stages of the mechanistic model. Thus, we have classifica-
tion of tested targets (hypotheses) rather than that of experiments. Different targets 
may be the common goal of one and the same series of experiments. 
      Consider the second basic aim of experimentation: to investigate or to explore 
novel objects. There are many different types of objects to be investigated or discov-
ered, for examples, a new significant phenomenon, or a new entity, or a new kind of 
activity, or a new mechanism. In order to puzzle out and uncover a complete mecha-
nism underlying a discovered novel phenomenon, scientists may need to perform a 
series of experiments that can investigate all working entities and all relevant kinds of 
activities. Thus, we have classification of discovered objects rather that of experi-
ments, because a series of experiments may be performed to discover all relevant ob-
jects.  
      Experimental targets and objects are not mutual exclusive, neither are interven-
tional directions and effects. They all may occur in one and the same experiment or a 
series of experiment for a single  subject. A series of experimental interventions may 
be performed for two experimental aims, use two interventional directions, and ac-
quire two interventional effects. One can exert an intervention into some mechanism 
and produce excitatory effects on one component and inhibitory effects on another in 
the same mechanism, depending on whether or not the feature of the intervened entity 
is essentially excitatory or inhibitory. Interventions may produce novel or unexpected 
phenomena that are used to test a mechanistic model and discover the mechanism as a 
whole. All these experimentally interventional modes make important discoveries in 
biology. The PaJaMo experiment is the best example for illustrating our claim. 
5. Experiments with multiple modes of interventions: discovering the synthesis of β-
galactosidas 
For a long time, historians of science have characterized the contribution of the 
PaJaMo experiment to the advancement in molecular biology and have argued the 
question that who should get the credited with the discovery of the repressor model 
(Morange 1998). Philosophers of biology have been more concern the questions of 
how the scientists generated and justified the repressor hypotheses and how the relat-
ed experiments contributed to discovery mechanisms. 
Kenneth Schaffner is the first philosopher who analyzed the PaJaMo experiment 
from the perspective of theory generation. Under the influence of the logical empiri-
cism, he argues that there is a “unitary logic” covering the reasoning of discovery and 
justification in the generation of the repressor hypotheses (Schaffner 1974a, 1974b, 
1993).  On his account, one does not need two kinds of generative contexts or reason5 -
ing pattern to understand the generation of new theories.  
Marcel Weber (2005) criticized Schaffner’s claim that the reasoning employed in 
generation of new theories is the same as that in justification. He argues that the gen-
 Logical empiricists distinguish between the “context of discovery” and the “context of justification”. 5
According to the traditional view, philosophy of science only concerns the way in which new theories 
are corroborated or justified while the way in which new theories are constructed or discover is the 
subject for history, psychology, or sociology of science (Popper 1959).  
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uine generative reasoning in the PaJaMo experiment is a kind of analogical reasoning. 
“In my view, the crucial question on which the validity of Schaffner’s conclusion 
turns is the following: Granted that the repressor model follows deductively from the 
complete results of the PaJaMo experiment plus some background assumptions, does 
this deductive argument reflect how Jacob and Monod actually generated this hypoth-
esis? Monod’s own recollections quoted above suggest that this is not the case. 
Rather, what Monod implies is that the repressor hypothesis was generated by an ar-
gument from analogy.” (Weber 2005:62) Although analogical reasoning cannot be de-
rived from a deductive argument nor be used in logical justification, it still occurs in 
the generation of new theories. Weber argues that analogical reasoning can be a kind 
of rational reasoning pattern even though it does not employ any general rules or pro-
cedures (Weber 2005: 55-63). In order to support the argument, Weber draws attention 
to the PaJaMo experiment. However, he analyzes the experiment in the subject of 
how biologists generate new theories or hypotheses by solving problems. He does not 
focus on the methodology of the experimentation in details.   
    Craver and Darden focus on the experimental analyzing. They propose a mecha-
nism-discovering approach to analyze how the PaJaMo experiments contributes to 
discover new mechanistic schemas (2013). They take the PaJaMo experiment as a 
searchlight to reveal how series of experiment with multiple interventions contributes 
to the construction of new mechanistic model.  
This experiment…ushered in an entirely new way of thinking about the mech-
anisms by which organisms regulate gene expression. Yet it would distort the 
structure of the experiment to see it an instance of an experiment for testing 
causal relevance…or as an experiment driven by the goals of identifying com-
ponents in a mechanism…Rather, the significance of the experiment lies in its 
ability to test a hypothesis about the active organization of the mechanism, to 
reveal that mechanism involves the inhibition of an inhibitor. (Craver and 
Darden 2013:140)  
On their account, the PaJaMo experiment is a series of experiments involving multi-
ple interventions. However, their work is providing the taxonomy of experimental 
types and their methodology is partial to the mechanism-centered approach. Based on 
their work, we develop a new framework of interventional modes to reexamine the 
series of PaJaMo experiments. The new framework comprises plural experimental 
aims and interventional modes. Among them, the inter-stage intervention as one of the 
interventional modes has not been mentioned by philosophers of biology before. Our 
goal is to provide a more complete view for generation of new biological theories that 
goes beyond the older dichotomies: the distinction between justification and discov-
ery and between theory-centered and phenomenon-centered. In what follows, we first 
introduce the background, unsolved problems, given hypotheses, and how new phe-
nomenon discovered in the PaJaMo experiments in order.  
5.1 Background and unsolved problem 
     Ever since the middle of the twentieth century, molecular biologists studied the 
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phenomenon of “diauxy” by combining genetic and biochemical approaches. The 
puzzling phenomenon was that when two food sources (say, glucose and lactose) were 
given in a microbial culture, the Escherichia coli bacteria (hereinafter to be referred 
as bacteria) digested one type of food sources (glucose) first, after a latency period, it 
digested the other type of food sources (lactose). By many experiments, biologist ob-
served that the phenomenon showed two successive growth curves and separated by a 
period of lag (see Fag. 2). 
     
    Figure 2. The phenomenon of diauxy was that bacteria would display different  
    digest ability corresponding to specific food resource. It showed two growth curves  
    and separated by a period of lag. Reproduced from Monod, Jacques (1947).  
    “The phenomenon of enzymatic adaptation: And its bearing on problem of  
    genetics and cellular differentiation.” p. 251. 
      The so-called phenomenon of diauxy was first noticed around 1900. In the 1930s 
and 40s, biologists viewed it a kind of adaptation. They thought that bacteria first 
produced a kind of enzyme to digest glucose, then, developed the ability to produce 
another kind of enzyme to digest lactose. They called the phenomenon “enzymatic 
adaptation,” because bacteria needed some moments to produce different enzyme. 
However, this term was dropped for its teleological meaning later.  
      Another conjecture for the phenomenon was that bacteria contained a general 
enzyme which could take on various properties for different circumstance changes. 
When glucose was present, the general enzyme displayed one shape to digest it; when 
lactose was present, the general enzyme switched another appropriate shape to digest 
it. The phenomenon of diauxy looked like that lactose stimulated or induced bacteria 
to making the corresponding changes. In the 1950s, biologists renamed the 
phenomenon “enzyme induction” Lactose was called “inducer” because biologists 
believed that lactose induced bacteria to produce enzymes. However, they did not 
really understand that what the nature of the “inducibility” was and how the 
mechanism underling the phenomenon operated.   
      Today we know that the mechanism underlying the phenomenon of induction is 
gene regulation, which can be simply described as the following: when both glucose 
and lactose are present in a microbial culture, bacteria will digest glucose first; when 
glucose is consumed, the genes of bacteria will begin to synthesize a specific enzyme 
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(say, β-galactosidase) to digest lactose. In other words, only when lactose is present, 
the genes synthesize β-galactosidase.  
      Since 1950s, biologists discovered several main genes involved in the mechanism 
of gene regulation. The genes can be distinguished to two kinds: structural genes and 
regulatory genes. There are three structural genes: lacZ, lacY, and lacA. The lacZ gene 
is responsible for encoding the β-galactosidase enzyme, which cleaves lactose into 
glucose and galactose, both of them are utilized as energy source for the cells. The 
lacY gene is responsible for encoding the enzyme permease, which inserts into cell 
membranes and transports lactose into the cells. The lacA gene is responsible for 
encoding β-galactoside transacetylase. These three structural genes are expressed only 
when lactose is present and glucose is absent. The regulatory genes are responsible for 
encoding two kinds of proteins: an activator called catabolite activation protein (CAP) 
and a repressor. The CAP normally binds to a specific site on DNA at or near the 
promoter (which is a region of DNA that initiates the transcription of structural genes) 
and the repressor binds to the operator (which is a region that regulates the activity of 
genes). The repressor is encoded by the lacI gene. When glucose is present, the 
repressor will repress the transcription. On the contrary, when glucose is absent and 
only lactose is present (or an external inducer is added), the repressor will be 
displaced from operator by inducers, namely repression of the repressor, thus, the 
lacZ and lacY genes are de-repressed (say, expressed). In this way, the combined 
effect of two regulators, the activation of the CAP and the repression of the repressor, 
will make the structural genes to be expressed. So what the unsolved problem here is 
that how did scientists discover that the enzyme induction could be effected by a 
mechanism of the repression of a repressor.      
5.2 Hypothesis to be tested 
      The enzyme induction (lactose induces bacteria to produce the enzymes) appears 
to be a kind of the positive activities of some entity. The repression of the repressor 
appears to be a kind of the negative activities of some entity. How did an ostensibly 
positive activity be discovered that was caused by the effect of double negative activi-
ties? How did the scientists generate a new mechanistic model for explaining the phe-
nomenon? 
      In the preparatory stage of the PaJaMo experiment, the scientists only knew that 
the lacZ, lacY, and lacI genes played important roles in enzyme induction. But they 
did not know that how these genes interacted with each other and how these genes 
organized altogether. They hypothesized the “internal inducer” model that assuming 
all enzyme induction was caused by a generalized mechanism that was involved in 
both the synthesis of “inducible” enzymes (i.e., enzymes that were made only in the 
present of inducers) and the synthesis of “constitutive” enzymes (i.e., enzymes that 
were made at all times, no matter whether inducers were present or not). In inducible 
system, the normal lacI gene (termed lacI+) would produce the inducible enzyme to 
inactivate the internal or endogenous inducer. As a result, the system required an 
external inducer to activate the lacZ and lacY genes. In the constitutive system, the 
mutant lacI gene termed (termed lacI-) would produce the constitutive enzymes to 
deactivate the lacI+ gene so that allowed the synthesis of the internal inducers. As a 
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result, no external inducer was needed to activate the lacZ and lacY genes (Pardee, 
Jacob, and Monod 1959:174). In addition, they also hypothesized that when the lacI+ 
and lacI- genes were both present in the cell at the same time, the constitutive system 
would dominate over the inducible system because of the lacI- gene had some 
stimulating effect on enzyme production. 
      For these assumptions, the zygote with the lacZ+ gene and the lacI+ gene would 
not produce β-galactosidase unless the external inducer was added because of the 
lacI+ gene; the zygote with the lacZ+ and the lacI- would produce β-galactosidase at 
all times, no matter whether the inducer was present or not, because of the the lacI- 
gene; the zygotes with the lacZ- and the lacI+ genes and the lacZ- and the lacI- genes 
wouldn’t produce β-galactosidase under any condition because of the lacZ- gene. In 
order to test the internal inducer model, especially the existence of the assuming 
internal inducers of the constitutive system, the scientists isolated various kinds of 
normal genes and mutant genes. One of the normal kinds was the lacZ+ gene that 
could produce β-galactosidase when met with the lacI+ and the other normal kind 
was the lacI+ gene that could inactivate the internal inducer to keep the system being 
inducible state. One of the mutant kinds was the lacZ- gene that lost the capacity to 
produce β-galactosidase and the other kind was the lacI- gene that could produce β-
galactosidase constitutively.  
5.3 Unexpected phenomena discovered by ensuing experiments  
      In the stage of testing the internal inducer model, the scientists arranged male bac-
teria (donor) containing mutant lacI- and lacZ- genes to mate with female bacteria 
(recipient) containing normal lacI+ and lacZ+ genes, in the absence of inducers. As 
mentioned above, the scientists predicted that the enzyme synthesis would produce β-
galactosidase. In internal inducer model’s term, the system would converse from in-
ducible state to constitutive state because of the dominance effect from the male’s 
lacI- gene. But to their surprise, the synthesis system did not work. The scientists rea-
soned that the inducible lacI+ allele should be dominant over the constitutive lacI- 
allele. The unexpected phenomenon became an anomaly to be investigated. No new 
model can guide scientist to design new experiments.  
      In such a situation, the scientists tried to understand the anomaly with the classical 
genetic reasoning. “This suggests that the dominant allele is the inducible (i+). If so, 
the i+ should eventually become expressed in mating of type (B) ─ i.e., the zygotes, 
initially constitutive, should eventually become inducible.” (Pardee, Jacob, and 
Monod 1959:174) In order to investigate the unexpected phenomenon, the scientists 
performed the experiments in opposite matting direction, that was, arranged male 
bacterium containing normal lacI+ and lacZ+ genes to mate with female bacterium 
containing mutant lacI- and lacZ- genes, both in the absent and in the present of 
inducer. As mentioned above, the scientists predicted that the enzyme synthesis would 
begin to produce β-galactosidase constitutively. Because when male’s lacZ+ genes 
entered females’ cell, where the mutant lacI- gene would produce the assumed 
internal inducer, the zygote should begin synthesize β-galactosidase and without 
stopping. But to their surprise again, the synthesis began but stopped after about two 
hours (see the horizontal line in Fig. 3)  
!14
      Why would the β-galactosidase synthesis interrupt in the circumstances of the 
presence of assumed internal inducer? Just then, when male’s lacI+ genes subse-
quently entered female’s cell, the scientists added external inducers, they found that 
the synthesis was resumed (see the upper and right curve in Fig. 3). How did lacI+ 
genes affect the synthesis to work again? The scientists reasoned, “When inducer 
added at this stage, enzyme synthesis is resumed, showing that the initially constitu-
tive z+i+/z-i- zygotes have not been inactivated, but have become 
inducible.” (Pardee, Jacob, and Monod 1959:175) Such the experimental outcome and 
explanation were considered to falsify the internal inducer model.  
    
 
    Figure 3. What the scientists observed was that after conjugation, the synthesis  
     began in the absence of inducers, but only for a few hours. After those few  
     hours, the synthesis resumed only in the adding of inducers externally.  
     Reproduced from Pardee, Jacob, and Monod (1959). p. 173. 
      For a long time, Monod had not completely abandoned the internal inducer 
model , even attended a seminar which given by Leo Szilard. However, after enough 
consideration, Monod had started to accept the idea that a kind of the positive 
activities (induction) could be caused by the effect of double negative activities (the 
repression of repressors). Then they proposed “the repressor model”. The lacI+ genes 
produced the “repressors” (later known were proteins). When no lactose was present 
in the environment, the repressors would block the synthesis by binding to the 
operator. When only lactose was present in the environment, the repressors would be 
inhibited by lactose, thus the genes would be able to synthesize β-galactosidase.  
According to the other, or ‘repressor’, model the activity of the galactosidase-
forming system is inhibited in the wild typify a specific ‘repressor’ 
synthesized under the control of the i+ gene. The inducer is required only in 
the wild-type as an antagonist of the repressor. In the constitutive (i-), the 
repressor is not formed, or is inactive, hence the requirement for an inducer 
disappears.” (Pardee, Jacob, and Monod 1959:176)  
Had several new experimental evidences, the scientists had confirmed that the exis-
tence of the repressors and convinced that the repression effects had justify the repres-
sor model. The repressor model was not only more empirically adequate than the in-
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ternal inducer model but also more simpler than it. Because the repressor model did 
not require an abstract and nonexistent entity.  
5.4 Multiple interventions for different aims and with different modes 
         
      The PaJaMo experiment was really a series of interventional experiments for one 
and the same subject. The experimentation involved multiple interventions for 
different aims and with different modes. It started with testing a given hypothesis, 
discovered unexpected phenomena, and then turned to toward an explorative aim 
without direction of any given hypothesis. After a series of investigation, the scientists 
provided a new model to solve and explain the novel phenomenon.      
       In the stage of testing the internal inducer model, the scientists produced the 
required mutants, to put them in the prepared experimental system, and to entice them 
to mate with one other. They intervened male bacterium containing the lacI- and lacZ- 
genes to mate with female bacterium containing the lacI+ and lacZ+. The 
experimental result was no synthesis occurred. This is the case of the mode of vertical 
intervention with inhibitory effect. In the stage of exploring the new phenomenon, the 
scientists intervened male bacterium containing the lacI+ and lacZ+ genes to inject 
into female’s cell containing the lacI- and lacZ-. The experimental result was that the 
synthesis began but stopped later. The immediate synthesis is the result of the mode of 
vertical intervention with excitatory effect (because of the lacZ+ genes). Once the 
lacI+ genes also entered the cell, the genes started to produce the repressors. When 
enough time had passed, the synthesis stopped. This is the result of the mode of 
vertical intervention with inhibitory effect. Later, the scientists added the external 
inducers, then the synthesis re-continued. It is the mode of horizontal intervention 
with excitatory effect. Because the scientists engineered the upstream stage of the 
mechanism of transcription and observed the positive changes of the downstream 
stage of the mechanism. 
      The PaJaMo experiment shows us that how multiple interventional modes used in 
a series of experiments. It also shows us that how interventional experiments used as 
essential means to realize plural experimental aims.  As Morange said, “it (the Pa6 -
JaMo experiment) represented the final step in the development of a new vision of 
biology that had been begun in the 1940s and that made the question of the informa-
tion contained in genes an ordering principle of all life.” (1998:159) It brings about 
the discovery of the mechanism of gene regulation and leads molecular biology enter-
ing into a new stage. 
     

6. Categories of Experimentation and the Nature of the PaJaMo Experiment 
  With regarding to the investigation of new phenomenon is one of the important experimental aims, 6
we may think of Water’s “genetic approach” (Water 2004, 2008). Actually, in our view, the PaJamo 
experiment generally fits the genetic approach. The scientists artificially produced mutants (used re-
quired mutants), gave genetic analyses (as the scientists said “The suggests that the dominant allele is 
the inducible (i+)…From these observation we may conclude that the constitutive (i-) allele is inac-
tive…” (Pardee, Jacob, and Monod 1959:174-175)), and recombined the mutant to reveal a new biolog-
ical process (as the scientists said “…this is precisely the case…is a very strong argument in favor of 
the repressor model.” (Pardee, Jacob, and Monod 1959:174-175)). All these steps leads to the scientific 
advancement. But Waters did not address the part of the experimental intervention in details. 
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For a long period of time, people believe that experimentation has only a single 
aim and function, i.e., testing theories. Since the end of the 20th century, the explorato-
ry aim and function of experimentation has been revealed by some philosophers of 
science (Burian 1997; Steinle 1997) and gotten much attention (Burian 2007; Elliot 
2007; Franklin 2005; O’Malley 2007; Steinle 2002; Waters 2004, 2007). Steinle 
(1997, 2002)’s distinction between theory-driven experimentation and exploratory 
experimentation has become a standard frame of categorizing experimentation 
(Franklin 2005: 888-889; O’Malley 2007: 339; Burian 2007: 286-288). However, 
these philosophers also emphasize that the distinction between theory-driven and ex-
ploratory experimentation does not mark a sharp division and the latter is not free of 
theory (See Waters 2007: 277-279).  Waters further notes the difference between be7 -
ing theory-directed and being theory-informed and the distinction between explorato-
ry and theory-driven experimentation is made by the ways in which an experiment 
depends on theory (2007: 277). Nevertheless, these philosophers agree the two dis-
tinctive categories of experimentation, although not sharp, largely works for method-
ological analyses. However, we wonder whether or not there would be an experiment 
or a series of organized experiments which was used to both test hypotheses and ex-
plore novel things. If there is one, then what category we should classify it into? The 
experiment might test a hypothesis, falsify it, find anomalous phenomena, and then 
enter into an unknown field and become exploratory. Thus, we should say that the ex-
periment is both theory-driven and exploratory. According to the previous discussion, 
we think that the PaJaMo experiment discussed in the previous section is the just one. 
As a consequence, this issues a challenge to the two basic categories of theory-driven 
and exploratory experimentation.  
      Elliot develops a taxonomy of exploratory experiments by discerning different 
kinds according to the three relatively independent dimensions: aims of experimental 
activity, role of theory in the activity, and methods or strategies for varying parame-
ters (2007: 324). According to his taxonomy, “testing a hypothesis” is neither an aim 
of nor plays a role in an exploratory experiment. The aims of exploratory experiments 
include (1) “identifying regularities and developing new concepts,” (2) “isolating or 
manipulating particular entities or phenomena,” (3) “developing experimental tech-
niques, instrumentation, or simulations,” and (4) “resolving anomalies.” The PaJaMo 
experiment explicitly realized aim 1 and 4. In order to resolve the classifying prob-
lem, one may simply add a third hybrid category of experimentation to the dichoto-
mous categories. As a consequence, the PaJaMo experiment should be classified to 
 All Burian (2007), Elliot (2007), and O’Malley (2007) emphasize this point. Burian points that there 7
are a sharp methodological division between advocates of “hypothesis driven science” and advocates 
of “data-driven science”. However, he emphasizes “[I]t is important to reduce the sharpness of this 
supposed dichotomy.” (2007: 286-287) Elliot (2007) claims that theory plays a minimal role relative to 
other forms of experimentation and characterizes a few roles of theory in exploratory experimentation 
(2007: 324). O’Malley examines the interaction between exploratory and theory-driven experimenta-
tion within the context of an exploratory program of research. 
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the third hybrid category.  However, this resolution brings the new problem of the 8
proliferation of varieties of hybrid experiments: for examples, experiments for both 
aim of testing and aim of manipulating particular entities, experiments for both aim of 
testing and aim of developing techniques, and so on. The point is to categorize exper-
imentation according to some relatively independent dimensions or criteria as those 
Elliot (2007) has provided.  
      At this point, let us discuss Elliot’s three independent dimensions. First, we can 
simply add the aim of testing hypotheses, model, and theories to the dimension of 
“aims of experimental activities.” Second, we take Waters’ distinction between “theo-
ry-directed” and “theory-informed” as two sub-dimensions of “role of theory in ex-
perimentation.” In order to offer a more full taxonomy of the second dimension, we 
want to add a third sub-dimension “theory-free”.  As for Elliot’s third dimension of 9
“methods or strategies for varying parameters, we want to introduce the two sub-di-
mensions of “interventional” and “non-interventional” to match up the topic of this 
paper, in which we draw a taxonomy of interventional modes from Craver and Dard-











Developing new concepts 
Isolating or manipulating entities 
Developing techniques and instrumentation 
Simulating 
Resolving Anomalies
Role of Theory in 
Experimentation
Theory-directed: Testing hypotheses; Identifying 
regularities; Developing new concepts, etc. 
Theory-informed: Providing background information; 
Serving as a starting point or foil; New theory 
being constituted by exploratory projects, etc. 
Theory-free
 The other resolution is the appealing to Waters’ distinction between experiments and programs of 8
investigative research which combines explanatory reasoning with investigatory strategies (Waters 
2004, 2007, 2008). According to this resolution, the PaJaMo experiment should be treated as a part of a 
program of investigative research for the regulatory mechanism of genes. However, our aim in this 
paper is only to analyze the PaJaMo experiment.
 Whether or not there are theory-free experiments depends on our interpretation or theory of the term 9
“theory”. Here we take a narrower interpretation of “theory” and set up the sub-dimension “theory-
free”. 
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Table 1: A taxonomy of characteristics of experimentation according to three relative-
ly dimensions 
    We believe that we can provide a more complete analysis of interventional exper-
iments in molecular biology according to the framework of three experimental dimen-
sions presented in the Table 1. 
7. Concluding remarks 
      We have argued that multiple experimental interventions are frequently used in 
biological practice. We have provided a taxonomy of modes of experimental interven-
tions that are developed from Craver and Darden’s taxonomy of experiments. The 
taxonomy of interventional modes is built according the three directions (top-down, 
bottom-up, and inter-stage) and two effects (excitatory and inhibitory). We reexamine 
the famous PaJaMo experiment (a series of experiments for a single subject) to illus-
trate the new taxonomic framework. We find that scientists pursue both aims of test-
ing hypotheses and investigating new phenomena. This motivate us to further consid-
er the possibility that a series of experiments is performed to realize different aims of 
experimentation by using different strategies or methods.  As a result, we provide a 
new taxonomy of characteristics of experimentation in which the molecular biological 
practice is adequately analyzed in the light of multiple aims and interventions.   
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